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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
LOUISE B. TAYLOR, et al,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
VIRGINIA CLARE JOHNSON,
!Defendant and Appellant.

CASE
NO. 10316

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE

This is an action by the plaintiff, for herself and as
guardian of her minor children, for damages for the wrongful death of her husband and father of the children, who
\\1as killed while in the process of removing a disabled
motor vehicle and trailer from the highway when defendant drove a vehicle against the trailer.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

'Dhis matter was originally filed and tried in Juab
County, and a jury returned a verdict of "no cause of
action". On appeal to the Supreme Court, Taylor vs. JohnsGn, Case No. 9874, filed June 18, 1964, the Supreme Court
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remanded the case to the District Court of Juab County
for a new trial. The first appeal is reported at 15 Utah 2d
842, 393 P. 2d 382.
Prior to the time the second trial was had, defendant
filed a motion for change of venue which was granted by
the District Court of Juab County, and the second trial
was held in the District Court of Utah County. At that
trial the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs
and against the defendant for $28,000.00. Judgment on
the verdict was entered November 10, 1964.
Defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, for a new trial. Those
motions were denied January 6, 1965, by the Honorable
Marcellus K. Snow of the District Court of Salt Lake
County, who tried the case in the District Court of Utah
County.
REI.IEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

The plaintiffs and respondents request that the jury
verdict be upheld and that the trial court be affirmed in
all particulars.
~TA.TEMENT

OF FACTS

Respondents will not re-state the facts as set out by
appellant, but will merely add certain material facts which
respondent feels the appellant inadvertently omitted or
neglected to set forth. References to the page of the
transcript of testimony in support of the additional facts
herein contained will be referred to as "Tr."
The headlights of the wrecker, when it was in position
picking up the Milner car and at the time when the defend··
ant approached, were on low beam (Tr. 65). In addition
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to the lights at the scene of the accident mentioned in appeUant's brief, there was a flood light on the wrecker
'
the headlights were on on the Milner car, and the headlights were on on the Kester car. Also, there were at
least four flashlights being used at the scene of the accident.
As she approached from the South and at a point one-half mile before she collided, the defendant saw the headlights and the oscillating lights on the wrecker, and recognized it to be a wrecker, and thought there might be an
accident ahead. At that time, she could not tell whether
the wrecker was moving or not, nor could she tell where
it was on the road (Tr. 172, 173). Until she reached a
point right in front of the wrecker, where she either had
to hit the same head-on or attempt to go around it, she
had never applied her brakes (Tr. 173, 178).
Mrs. Kester had had no difficulty wlhatever when
other vehicles approached from the South while the wrecker
was in place prior to the time that the defendant's car
came on the scene (Tr. 54, 56). The reason Mrs. Kester
could not get out in front of the wrecker to warn, as she
had been able to do in other instances, was because the
defendant was approaching at too great a speed (Tr. 50,
51, 54).
Officer Rex Hlill was assisted in making the investigation by officers Sherwood and Ed Pitcher of the Utah
State Highway Patrol (Tr. 85, 89, and 125).
During the course of the investigation the investigating officers made three road tests for the purpose of determining the coefficient of friction upon the roadway. 'l\vo
of the tests were made early in the morning (Tr. 80)' and
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the third test was made in afternoon of ,that day (Tr. 85).
At the ti~e of the investigation the road was dry (Tr. 64),
and was m the same condition as it was at the time the
accident happened (Tr. 83).
At the time of the impact between the defendant's
vehicle and the trailer and Kester vehicle, the emergency
brake was set on the Kester vehicle (Tr. 19, 46).
The defendant's vehicle laid down 23 feet of skid marks
on one side, and 16 feet of skid marks on the other side
leading to the gouge marks (Tr. 74) . The distance that
defendant's vehicle traveled after impact was 56 feet rather
than 46 feet (Tr. 94).
ARGUMENT

POINT I
INSTRUCTION NO. 9, AS GIVEN BY THE COURT,
WAS IN ALL RESPECTS A PROPER INSTRUCTION
ON THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.
The jury was instructed that it was the duty of the
defendant to use reasonable care in driving her car to avoid
danger to herself and others and to observe and be aware
of the conditions of the highway, the traffic thereon, and
other existing conditions (Instruction No. 6). Reasonable
or ordinary care was defined in Instruction No. 5. They
were further instructed in Instruction No. 7, that a person
approaching a wrecker in darkness, which wrecker is displaying appropriate lights, and who knows it to be a
wrecker, is charged with knowledge that the operation
thereof may necessitate parking in lanes of traffic, travel·
ing against traffic, and may otherwise interfere with the
normal flow of traffic. 41-6-140.20, Utah Code Annotated.
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1953. Fwiher that it is the duty of such person to decrease
his speed or stop if necessary, until it can be determined
that it is reasonably safe to proceed, and that failure to
do so may constitute negligence.
Instruction No. 11 advised the jury that no inference
of negligence could be drawn from the fact that ·an accident
had happened and that the mere fact, if it was a fact, that
it was po~ible for a person to avoid an accident that he did
not avoid, does not, of itself, justify a finding that he was
negligent. Also, that if a person used ordinary care and
did all that an ordinary prudent person would have done
in the circumstance, he is not chargeable with negligence.
Further, that the person whose conduct was set up as a
standard is not the extraordinary cautious individual nor
the exceptionally skilled one, but a person of reasonable
and ordinary prudence.
The jury was instructed that before there could be
any liability on the part of defendant it must appear from
the evidence that she was guilty of negligence. Ordinary
care was again defined and emphasized (lnstTUction No.
12). They were instructed by No. 13, that the law did not
require defendant to anticipate or guard against anything
that could not be reasonably expected and did not require
her to regulate her conduct with reference to any conduct
on the part of James W. Taylor not reasonably to be expected. F1urther, that she was not required to be extraordnarily alert or to foresee all that she could now see by
looking back; nor was she required to use extraordinary
caution for the avoidance of the accident that she could
not have expected under the circumstances.
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By Instruction No. 14, they were told that the defendant could not be expected to react differently than she did
after the discovery that the wrecker was still standing on
her side of the highway. Instruction No. 30 told 1lhe jury
that they were to consider all of the instructions as a whole
and not single out any individual point or instruction and
ignore the others.
The instructions thus given by the court in this matter, taken as a whole, properly and fairly presented the
iss~es as to the defendant's negligence to the jury. If the
court leaned at all in its instructions it was in the defendant's favor by repeatedly emphasizing that only ordinary
care was required of the defendant (Instructions Nos. 11,
12, 13, and 14).
The question of whether Taylor was guilty of contributory negligence precluding recovery was also fairly and
properly submitted to the jury, basically in Instructions
Nos. 15 and 9. The jury was instructed by Instruction No.
15, that the heirs of a negligent person could not recover
against another negligent person, and that this was true
even where one is more negligent than the other. Also,
that if the jury found that James W. Taylor was negligent
and that his negligence proximately contributed to cause
the accident, plaintiffs could not recover.
In Instruction No. 9, the jury was told that a wrecker
operator, in darkness, has the duty to reasonably warn
approaching traffic of the obstruction on the highway by
displaying lights, flares or other practical means and that
if he failed to do so, they could find that he had been guilty
of negligence. They were also instructed that if the defendant saw the wrecker and knew it to be a wrecker in
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sufficient time to have reasonably avoided the colli:sion
'
then any negligence of Taylor in failing to display lights,
flares, or other practical warning devices, would not be a
contributing proximate cause of his death, and the defense
of contributory negligence would not defeat plaintiff's recovery.
Under Instruction No. 9, before the jury could eliminate the matter of failure to give adequate warning, if any,
as contributory negligence precluding recovery, it would
have to find, (a) that the defendant saw the wrecker, (b)
that she knew it to be a wrecker, and (c) that she saw it
in sufficient time to have reasonably avoided the collision.
In context, and in effect, the court simply said in Instruction No. 9 that if Taylor failed to give a warning it does
not necessarily preclude plaintiff's recovery from defendant if, in fact, defendant received a warning in some manner in sufficient time to have avoided the collision, however, and by whom, it may have been given.
Upon the facts of this case, and taking into consideration all of the instructions heretofore mentioned with reference to the necessity for finding negligence on the part
of the defendant which was a proximate cause of Taylor's
death, we believe that Instruction No. 9 was proper and
a fair statement of the law. It is axiomatic that the only
purpose of any warning device or requirement to warn is
to give notice of a potentially dangerous condition, and if a
person actually receives a warning and fails to act reasonably in accordance therewith, it is difficult to conceive that
negligent conduct, causing injury, on the part of the person receiving the warning could be excused on the ground
that the party injured failed to give a warning. Velasquez
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vs. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 12 Utah 2d 379, 366 P. 2d 989;
McMurdie vs. Underwood, 9 Utah 2d 400, 346 P. 2d 711.
The question of whether defendant acted reasonably was
submitted to the jury in the several instructions heretofore
mentioned.
Even if Instruction No. 9 is isolated from the others
and construed as precluding a finding, by the jury, of contributorry negligence in a manner other than failure to give
warning, it would still be proper. This is so because, as a
matter of law, there are no facts in the case except those
pertaining to warning which could legally constitute contributory negligence precluding recovery. Taylor vs. John-

son, supra.

POINT II
THERE WAS NO ERROR ON TIIE PART OF THE
TRIAL COURT IN REFUSING TO GIVE REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS PURPORTING TO SUBMIT DEFENDANT'S "TIIEORY" OF THE CASE.
On brief, appellant raises the question, but fails to
mention or identify the requests she complains were not
given. We will have to assume that she is referring to defendant's requests No. 7, No. 8, and No. 9. No exception
was taken to the refusal to give request No. 10.
Defendant's requests Nos. 7, 8, and 9 all contain provisions to the effect that the wrecker operator had a duty
to warn approaching motorists by the use of lights, flares,
guards or other warning signals. Each of these instruc·
tiorns also contains material relating to some orther "theory"
of the case. Request No. 7 refers to the duty orf one who
places himself in a dangerous position to use reasonable
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care to watch for the approach of other vehicles on the
highway. This is, in essence, the same instruction as No.
30 given in the first trial. It was not a proper instruction
in this case because it presents a fact situation which is
not supported by any evidence whatever. Taylor v. Johnson,
supra. Request No. 8 is to the effect that if the wrecker
operator had time to place flares or other warning signals
upon the highwiay and failed to do so, the jury could find
him negligent. The jury was instructed properly as to
'l aylor's duty to warn in Instruction No. 9.
Request No. 9 tells the jury that Taylor could be found
negligent if he left the wrecker upon the highway for a
period longer than the reasonable length of time necessary
to remove the wrecked or damaged vehicle. This is about
th same instruction as No. 29 given in the previous trial
Such instruction is improper here because it outlines a fact
situation which has no support whatever by any evidence.
Also, it fails to require that the jury find it to be a proximate cause of the accident. Taylor v. Johnson, supra.
Inasmuch as each orf the instructions requested by defendant contained propositions or theoretical facts which
were not supported by any evidence, they were properly
r2fused by the court.
POINT III
INSTRUCTION NO. 10, RELATING TO THE PRESUMPTION OF iDUE CARE, WAS PROPER.
The instruction contains the same language as is set
forth in Jury Instruction Forms for Utah, Form No. 16.8
at page 54.
Such instruction would be improper only if evidence
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was adduced which would make a prima facie case that
the decedent was guilty of contributory negligence which
proximately caused the accident. Mecham v. Allen, 1 Utah
2d 79, 262 P. 2d 285.
Here, again, we encounter defendant's contentions, (a)
that the wrecker wias left on the highway for an unreasonable length of time; (b) that decedent placed himself in a
position of danger between the trailer and the automobile
to which it was being fixed; and (c) that although Taylor
had other warning devices in his wrecker, he failed to use
them.
With reference to the first contention that he left the
wrecker on the highway for an unreasonable length of
time, the only evidence concerning this point is that of
Mr. and Mrs. Kester, both of whom were at the scene
throughout all of the difficulty. Their testimony was substantially as follows: The wrecker operator approached
from the north and stopped his vehicle off the highway on
the west side. He came over to the Milner car and trailer
to look the situation over. Since the rear axle of the Milner car was broken, he could see that it would have to be
hoisted and towed from its rear. To accomplish that, the
trailer would have to be removed. Mr. Kester offered to
pull the trailer in and it was removed from behind the
Milner car and placed to the east side of the road where
Mr. Kester could back his car to it. The trailer hitch had
to be removed from Milner's car and affixed to that of
Kester. While the decedent moved his wrecker into position, affixed his hoist to the rear of the Milner car and
got that vehicle ready to be removed, Kester and Milner
were in the process of attaching the trailer to the Kester
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car. As Taylor finished lifting the automobile, he was asked
by Milner if he had a socket wrench that would tighten
the bolt on the trailer hitch. Taylor secured the wrench
from the wrecker and was in the process of tightening that
bolt on 1Jhe trailer hitch when the accident occurred (Tr.
8 thru 22, and Tr. 38 thru 46). The time that elapsed between the completion of hoisting the damaged auto and the
oocurrence of the accident was not over two or three minutes at most (Tr. 58). There is no evidence whatever that
the decedent left the wrecker on the highway for a longer
period than was actually required to get the automobile
and trailer in condition to be towed away. Moreover, this
could not have been a proximate cause of the accident.
Taylor vs. Johnson, supra.
With respect to whether decedent placed himself in
a position of danger and failed to wat.ch for other vehicles
coming from the south, the only evidence is as follows: Decedent was crouched down between the trailer and the
Kester car fastening the bolt on the trailer hit.oh. His view
to the rear was blocked by the trailer (Tr. 21). The problem here is the same as it was with Instructions 28 and 30
given in the first trial. There is no evidence to support
or justify appellant's contention in this respect. Taylor vs.
.Johnson, supra.
Mr. Taylor did have other warning devices in ms
truck which he did not use, but the fact remains that ihe
did display warning lights indicating the presence of the
wrecker on the roadway, and defendant admitted that she
saw the warning lights at a time when she was one-half
mile away and tha:t she recognized it as a wrecker (Tr.
178) . Additional flares could have served no other put""
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pose than to warn, which warning defendant already had.

Velasquez vs. Greyhound Lines, Inc., supra.
In any event, the question of whether defendant had
adequate warning was submitted to the jury.
POINT IV

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING EVI·
DENCE AS TO THE "DRAG FACTOR" AT THE SCENE
OF THE ACCIDENT.

Highway Patrolman Hill was an eJq>erienced officer,
having been employed by the Utah Highway Patrol for
more than 9 years (Tr. 62). The officer had received
special training in accident investigation, including train·
ing in determining speed from skid marks and from force
of impact (Tr. 63).
Sgt. Sherwood of the Highway Patrol also partici·
pated in the investigation of the accident. Sgt. Sherwood
has been on the Highway Patrol for almost 24 years (Tr.
125). He had had special training in accident investiga·
tion and reconstruction, including training from North·
western University (Tr. 125). Borth officers participated
in the tests to determine the drag factor (Tr. 126). Both
officers testified that they had investigated many acci·
dents and had made tests as to braking and stopping dis·

tances.

The investigation of this accident lasted all night (Tr.
80). At the time of the accident the road was dry and in
good condition (Tr. 64). The officers made three tests
of the roadway to determine the co--efficient of friction.
They made the first two right after they got thru at the
hospital and the third at a later time Tr. 80). To make
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the tests they drove the car down the road at thirty miles
per hour, violently applied brakes, and measured the skid
marks made by all four wheels and divided it by four (Tr.
81). The tests were made at the scene of the accident
(Tr. 83, 85). The officers had a known speed and a known
skidding distance, and by relating these two known factors
to the nomograph the drag factor was ascertained (Tr.
85, 86).
As pointed out in the appellant's brief, the Supreme

Court of Utah has approved the use of a pre-computed
chart by an experienced officer. Gitrens vs. Lundberg, 3
Utah 2d 392, 284 P. 2d 1115; Pe~rso.n vs. Nielsen, 9 Utah
2d 302, 343 P. 2d 731.
Counsel for defendant examined both officers quite
extensively on cross-examination, and asked Officer Hill
whether he had measured the co-efficient of friction on
the gravel· shoulder east of the hard surface of the highway (Tr. 123). Officer Sherwood was cross-examined regarding co-efficient of friction on the highway and on the
shoulder of the road (Tr. 135). Had counsel desired, he
could easily have drawn from either officer the wheel
measurements of skid marks laid down by their car during
the test and thereby have checked their arithmetic for
possible error. Likewise, counsel could have inquired concerning any possible change in road condition between the
time of the accident and that of the tests. These were experienced officers, giving no appearance or manifestation
of any bias one way or the other, and had there been any
difference in the road surface they would ·have made it
known. In his objection at the trial, counsel gave the impression that he was more concerned about the use of the
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calculator-"! have no objection to him telling what the
four wheel marks were, the average length and what they
were, but he said he used a calculator." * * * "But he
testified all he did was test the length of the brake marks."
* * * "He used some calculator." (Tr. 82). The calculator mentioned was the nomograph (Tr. 86). If the road·
way had been damp or wet when the tests were made, it
is obvious that the friction of the road would have been
less than when dry, as it was when the accident occurred,
and that the result of the lesser co-efficient of friction fac·
tor would have worked to defendant's benefit.
The evidence relating to the drag factor was properly
received by the Court.
POINT V
THE OPINION EVIDENCE OF SGT. PITCHER OF
THE UTAH STATE HIGHWAY PATROL AS TO THE
SPEBD OF THE JOHNSON VEillCLE WAS PROPERLY
RECEIVED BY THE COURT.
Sgt. Pitcher was an expert and was so recognized by
defendant. After plaintiffs had rested, Pitcher was called
by defendant as her own witness, and was asked hypotheti·
cal questons which could be directed only to an expert on
both her direct and redirect examination (Tr. 162, 167).
Any complaint in this regard was thereby Waived.
On the merits, however, it is submitted that the wit·
ness was an expert. Officer Pitcher had been with the
Utah State Highway Patrol for 24 years. He was training
officer for the patrol and director of the police academy
at Camp Williams. This officer had attended the Traffic
Institute at Northwest University, the Police Academy of
the California Highway Patrol, had attended college, where
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he had studied physics, although he had no degree, and
had worked closely with prominent professors of physics
at Utah universities. He was otherwise highly trained and
skilled through study of books and publications and a great
amount of personal experience in automobile accident investigation (Tr. 141, 142, 143). He had had experience
reconstructing accidents from fooce of impact (Tr. 143).
He had qualified as an expert in the courts of this state
on possibly 50 occasions during the years (Tr. 144). Moreover, Sgt. Pitcher had personally assisted the other officers in the initial investigation of the accident in question
(Tr. 89).
The question as to the qualification of a person who is
tendered as an expert is to be determined preliminarily by
the trial judge, and the court's decision will not ordinarily
be reversed on appeal unless it is shown to have been based
on an error of law or to have been an abuse of judicial
discretion. 2 Jones on Evidence, paragraph 414, page 780.
'Dhis Court has said that the ruling of the trial court as
to >Vhether a witness qualifies as an expert should not be
disturbed lightly or at all unless it clearly appears that
he was in error in his judgment on the matter. Webb vs.
Olin Mathieson Chemical Company, 9 Utah 2d 275, 342 P.
2d 1094.
The difference between the hypot:hetical question asked
Sgt. Pitcher by the defendant on direct examination (Tr.
162), and that asked by plaintiffs, is that defendant's question embraces a fact situation wherein defendant's vehicle
is assumed to have come to rest within the distance stated,
without taking into account any collision whatever with
the trailer and the Kester car (Tr. 164), whereas in the
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hypothetical question asked by plaintiffs, the fact of a collision with the Plymouth and the trailer was included (Tr.
145).
On cross-examination defendant asked Officer Pitcher
if he used the stated distance of skid for the Johnson vehicle in his calculation and the officer stated that he did.
Counsel neglected to ask him if that was the only factor
he took into account in arriving at his formula conclusion
as to total distance (Tr. 148). The officer explained that
the so-called nomograph formula could not be applied because there had been a collision involved here (Tr. 149).
Plaintiff's hypothetical question embraced the fact that
there had been a collision (Tr. 145). On cross-examination defendant simply failed to ask the witness how he
had weighted his formula to take the collision into account.
In any event, none of this runs to his qualification as
an expert, but only to his credibility and the weight which
should be given to his testimony by the jury.
CONCLUSION

Respondent respectfully contends and urges that there
was no error whatever on the part of the trial court in
the rulings or in the instructions complained of by appellant and that the verdict of the jury should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
ALDRICH, BULLOCK & NELSON
Clair M. Aldrich
35 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent

